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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Executive Registry

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Director, Office of Legislative Liaison

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NOTE TO:

- Two pieces attached re our Congressional relationship: 1) Oversight Quid pro Quo;
  2) a cut at a goals statement.
- O Either or both might be distributed inhouse (to educate, inform, influence) our own troops and to the Oversight Committees in a positive effort at improved relations, as a two-way deal.
- o Welcome comments.

Charles A. Briggs

N.B. Parts of the "CIA Quid" came from Helene Boatner's papers.

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## Congressional Oversight - Quid Pro Quo

TWO

## I. CIA Quid

o Our Congressional Oversight Committees have a legitimate right to accurate and timely information about the Agency and the DO. It is in our interest to provide that information so that any differences with Congress focus on substance rather than on whether we have told them all we should have and at an appropriate time.

- o We must, of course, protect sources and methods, but we should not use that excuse to conceal information. Our objective with Congress is not to tell them as little as possible but rather to tell them as much as possible without endangering operations. It behooves us to provide information with grace and alacrity, not grudgingly and cautiously.
- o We should address the issues, whether or not the specific questions asked are correctly framed to get at them.
- o Exaggeration, evasion and misdirection on minor issues undermine our credibility with Congress on all issues.
- o We must be absolutely neutral, politically, with and between Committees and Members of Congress.
- o We should understand and respect the Congressional function and recognize the responsibilities that rest on Members and Committees.

## II. Congressional Quo

- o The Congressional Oversight Committees must make unusual efforts to perform their role in a bipartisan and secure manner to ensure the credibility and professional respect necessary for the process to work.
- o Oversight Committee staff self-discipline is required to avoid overlapping, repetitive and encyclopedic questions which reduce the credibility of the oversight process, tend to erode security, and have great manpower impact on analysts and operators.
- o Reasonableness must prevail to prevent oversight from degenerating into micromanagement.
- o A positive goal of oversight, balancing the watchdog role, is that of buffer and defender of a strong U.S. intelligence capability, especially within Congress but also in assuring the public.
- o Oversight Committee Members and staff should understand and respect the intelligence and covert action functions and recognize the responsibilities that rest on the personnel who direct these activities at home and abroad.



Keep the Congress informed of pertinent finished intelligence.

Provide the appropriate Committees of Congress with timely and appropriate information on Agency activities which have the potential for affecting national policies regarding foreign affairs, national security and the domestic welfare.

Assist in the passage of legislation which strengthens the U.S. foreign intelligence effort, and assist in resisting the passage of legislation which weakens the U.S. intelligence effort.

Provide good relations and communications between the Congress and the Central Intellignece Agency.

Coordinate intelligence community views on pending legislation.

## Congressional CIA Goals

Provide Congressional oversight and control of intelligence and covert action to assure that these functions are performed as authorized and are authorized to perform in a manner consistant with public policy.

Provide the resources and legislative authority to give the nation the best possible intelligence capability.

Serve as surrogate for the entire Congress on classified intelligence and covert action matters.

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Notes: Chuck - I agree with all. How hard a task is it to 'maintain' (develop!) a central repository? My sense is, we don't have one.

We do some impressive things in <u>Washington</u> too. What about our aggressive program to bring a few key people to our building to hear something important every now and then?

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Congressional Relations: Some Additional Thoughts the to the total of the total o

- o The perception of cooperation with Congress is as important as the substance a confrontational style gives the impression that we are holding back.
- o The cardinal sin to an Oversight Committee Member is to be blindsided on intelligence information. If a flap is brewing, wolunteer information.
- o In-house statements advocating or suggesting stonewalling may sound macho but, in the end, are mostly hot air. They encourage and perpetuate a mindset that has proven to be counterproductive.
- o The Agency must speak with one voice to Congress uncoordinated Congressional contacts are a prescription for disaster.
- o The budget process is the most consistently important activity with the Congress; next is the continuous legislation process. Both functions must be carefully coordinated in-house.
- O Consistency is vital in our response to Congress. Staffers talk to one another constantly and some love to catch us in inconsistent testimony. A central repository of Congressional responses is a must and will ease answering redundant requests.
- o There are four standing Oversight Committees. If one doubts it, try to take an authorization bill to the Treasury without an appropriation chop.
- O Virtually all the Committees have more staff continuity than does our Office of Legislative Liaison. Most staffers respect and would like to support the Agency. Responsiveness is the key.
- o Encourage Member and staff travel overseas. Notwithstanding station burden, travelers always come back impressed.

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